Contact: Beth Daley or Eric Miller at defense@pogo.org or (202) 347-1122

Low-rate initial production is a critical step in the Pentagon's acquisition process that almost always seals in concrete the future purchase of a weapon system even before it is proven to be effective and affordable. On August 14, the Pentagon's Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) is scheduled to consider approving initial production of the F-22 tactical fighter.

But low-rate production of the nation's most costly ever and largely untested fighter is premature.

Here's why the DAB should reject low-rate production of the F-22:

• Costs are soaring. The F-22 is still in development and already predictions of cost overruns have reached $9 billion, according to a recent estimate by an internal Secretary of Defense group. General Accounting Office audits of a myriad of weapon systems have repeatedly shown that the most cost-effective weapons are those that are operationally tested prior to going into production. No matter how few aircraft are produced, historically a weapon system becomes virtually unstoppable after it enters low-rate production, and fixes and redesigns become more costly.
  
  
• Testing is being reduced. Because the F-22 program is over budget and development testing is significantly behind schedule, the Air Force is cutting back on critical testing. In testimony last month to the Senate Subcommittee on Air-Land Forces, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force Darleen Druyun said that the avionics flight testing program has been reduced by 22 percent to 1,530 hours from original plans of 1,970 test hours. Aircraft delivery delays and redesigns also have cost the F-22 program 61 months of testing, according to the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E). The result so far has been a reduction in the number of flight test points by about 25 percent, according to the OT&E. A test point measures how an aircraft will perform at such variables as a specific speed, altitude and G force.
  
  
• Operational testing is being delayed. Operational testing on the F-22 is now expected to begin as late as August 2003. Developmental testing is driven by science, but lacks real-world circumstances. Operational testing focuses on the battle environment and the military's tactics and strategy, essential to ensuring effective weapons. The V-22 Osprey is a tragic example of what can happen when the Pentagon attempts to rush production of a weapon prior to correcting deficiencies identified in operational testing.
  
  
• The toughest testing remains. According to the Pentagon's chief tester, because testing is behind on the F-22, there isn’t enough information to assess its performance. In past testing numerous deficiencies have been identified including problems with the aircraft's brakes, main landing gear struts, cockpit design, environmental control system, intraflight data links, and missile launch detect performance. Recent revelations have identified an even more serious problem: Cracks have developed in the F-22's tail that may require a costly redesign.

But the DAB is not the only decision-making body to be pressured by the Air Force to step up the pace and funding of the F-22 program. In recent weeks, Air Force officials have been asking Congress to lift a $20.4 billion engineering and development cost cap on the aircraft. (Congress' cap on F-22 production costs is $37.6 billion.)

Congress should not appease the Air Force by giving it a blank check that will only ensure that F-22 engineering and development costs will continue to soar.

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