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 Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to comment on controlling costs in tactical aircraft programs.The Project On Government Oversight (POGO) investigates, exposes, and seeks to remedy systemic abuses of power, mismanagement, and subservience by the federal government to powerful special interests. Founded in 1981, POGO is a politically-independent, nonprofit watchdog that strives to promote a government that is accountable to the citizenry. Just like all of you, we continue to read troubling public accounts detailing out-of-control cost escalation in the F/A-22 program, and reports of seemingly insurmountable technological challenges. We also understand from our contacts and sources that critical problems within the program have been the subject of some rather heated internal debate at the Pentagon. Certainly debate is fruitful, but we'd like a better public explanation of why program costs are spinning out of control, and why stubborn technical challenges can't seem to be met. POGO typically focuses on holding weapons systems accountable, and we rarely call for the outright cancellation of a major weapons system. However, in light of the 9/11 tragedy, we are now more than ever convinced that an F/A-22 buy is not consistent with the Pentagon's goal of "transforming" the military. In fact, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has publicly stated that although he has to pick his battles on canceling systems, killing the F/A-22 is a battle he's considering taking on. The F/A-22 essentially has become an aircraft without a mission, not unlike the B-2 Bombers that have for the most part been sitting on runways even during recent conflicts. Why purchase one $200 million aircraft like the F/A-22 when you can buy several F-18 Super Hornets, F-16 Falcons, or F-15 Eagles for roughly the same price? It doesn't make much sense to us. There is no Soviet Air Force to destroy, and there wasn't even a single enemy aircraft flying during the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. "The F/A-22 has no role," one Pentagon insider recently told us. "What air force are we fighting? The Soviet Union? China? Iran?" The already checkered story of F/A-22 development has only gotten worse in recent months. First, we heard of a house-cleaning within the program which resulted in the replacement of several top program managers. Then last month, the General Accounting Office reported that the Air Force is not implementing cost-saving measures as promised, and is even hiding program cost overruns from Congress. The GAO study also pointed out that the F/A-22 program is experiencing several technical problems, including violent movement or "buffeting" of the aircraft's vertical fins, overheating in some areas of the aircraft, and a weakening of materials in the horizontal tail. Although the Air Force is pressing to begin operational testing by late summer, the F/A-22 has yet to be tested at altitudes below 10,000 feet, a critical requirement in its new found mission as an attack plane. It's no secret that the aircraft's most troubling and potentially costly problem is the instability of its avionics software. Imagine yourself as an F/A-22 pilot in a dogfight with an enemy aircraft and suddenly, without warning, your entire display panel goes blank. It's a little like a soldier going into battle blind and deaf. Our sources tell us this is precisely what has repeatedly happened during F/A-22 testing in recent weeks. These several-minute-long computer shutdowns have occurred when pilots attempted to use the aircraft's radar, communication, navigation, identification, and electronic warfare systems at the same time, the GAO says. Despite this critical problem, the number of hours scheduled for testing the aircraft's avionics has been shortened. Of course, anyone who studies the history of the Pentagon's acquisition system would be hard-pressed to claim that rising costs, the dumbing down of testing, and the shrinking number of buys are unique to the F/A-22. It's like when the sports moguls tell us that they will build us a Cadillac baseball or football stadium which will only cost the taxpayers $250 million but they actually end up building us a Ford for $350 million. Low-balling, I believe it's called. What you as Members of Congress are facing right now is a repeat of the procurement of the B-2 Bomber. At first, the Air Force told us that $40 billion would buy from 135 to 150 B-2s. In the end, you might recall, you only got 20 B-2s for that same price tag, each costing about $2 billion. The F/A-22 is on the same path. In the beginning, we were told that the Air Force would buy 800 aircraft for $40 billion, an estimate that was soon reduced to 750 aircraft for an increased $64.2 billion price tag. In 1991, the number of aircraft that amount would purchase declined to 680; in 1997, 339; and last year, only 303. Last month, the GAO reduced the estimated number of buys to only 276. One wonders what the future numbers will be as program costs continue to rise. Much like the B-1 and B-2 bombers, fighter aircraft like the F/A-22 are "exploding in cost and imploding in sheer numbers," according to an August 2001 paper written for POGO by Colonel Everest E. Riccioni, a member of the so-called "Fighter Mafia" and one of the men behind the development of the F-16. Here's the pattern, according to Colonel Riccioni: Fighters are getting more complex and expensive and fewer are being bought by the military. In the decade following World War II, the U.S. was able to purchase about 17,000 fighters. But now, with more costly fighters being built, the result is a dangerous decline in fleet strength and we are headed for a troubling state of affairs Colonel Riccioni calls "unilateral disarmament." To quote Colonel Riccioni, "The F-22 was conceived on my watch at the Flight Dynamics Laboratory. It was intended to be able to fly deep into the heart of the former Soviet Union at supersonic speeds and without being detected so as to intercept and destroy Russian bombers well before they could carry and drop nuclear bombs on the United States or our allies. The success of the F-22 was to be guaranteed by 70,000 pounds of thrust driving a 50,000 pound aircraft. It was to have 'magical' avionics, providing its pilot great battle awareness. And it was projected to fulfill its mission at a bargain basement cost per unit of about $50 million or about the same price as the F-15C, the aircraft it was meant to replace." Those visions of the F/A-22 have long since evaporated, and Colonel Riccioni is predicting that the Air Force will ultimately only be able to afford 100 to 175 F/A-22s. "This means the cost of the F-22 could escalate to insane levels - beyond $350 million per aircraft," Colonel Riccioni wrote. "Meanwhile the size of our Air Force's fleet of fighters would be reduced to such a small number that we would, in effect, be rendering it impotent. The idea of replacing the current air superiority potential of 1600 F-15s and F-16s which are admittedly wearing out, with that of 175 F-22s is manifestly absurd." It doesn't take a clairvoyant to see that the F/A-22 is shaping up to be a part of the problem rather than a solution to the Air Force's shrinking tactical fighter fleet. It may be sleek-looking and fly a little bit faster and longer than other U.S. fighters, and it may be somewhat harder to detect on a radar screen in darkness, but it's a budget buster, its structural soundness is suspect, and its avionics package is still little more than a dream. The Air Force wants this aircraft so bad that it's willing to mortgage the future. While there seems to be a lot of talk about pulling the plug on the program, no one at the Pentagon, including so far Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, seems willing to do the deed. We fear that unless you as Members of Congress have the will to hold the military and defense contractors accountable, the F/A-22 will become another sorry chapter in the history of Pentagon acquisition boondoggles. Thank you for inviting me to testify before the Subcommittee. I am happy to answer any questions.
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