Appendix for
Nuclear Power Plant Security: Voices from Inside the Fences
September 12, 2002
Appendix A
Statement by Guard A.
Approved September 5, 2002
He has been a guard at the plant for over 20 years. He has no retirement plan.
The guards are working 12 hour shifts, six days a week overtime - staying in compliance with the NRC by not working over 72 hours. The guards have serious fatigue and alertness problems on days 5 and 6, particularly on the night shift.
In early September a guard refused to work his sixth consecutive 12-hour shift and was fired by Wackenhut.
"Morale sucks."
He talked to the NRC regional people about the problem of overtime, fatigue and morale, and there is no interest.
Wackenhut can not keep people. 70% of the guards have under one year of experience, 50-60% of the guard supervisors have less than one year of experience. However, management claims publicly there is only a 15% turnover rate.
They have handguns, shotguns, and recently got AR-15s.
They were recently ordered to carry their primary weapon for the first time.
He feels it is a serious problem that the DBT is essentially the same as when he arrived over 20 years ago.
The guards "don't think much of [the current DBT]" in light of the events of 9/11.
He believes they have a fair chance of beating the current DBT, but not if it is increased.
Less than 20% of the guards are former military or law enforcement personnel.
He does not trust the NRC - "They're more of a cheerleader for the nuclear industry than a watchdog."
Confusion on the guard force over the use of deadly force is a real problem.
He does not believe the utility is serious about threat to the facitilites.
It will take a long time for the NRC and licensee to get their act together to adequately defend the plants.
Appendix B
Statement by Guard B. at Decommissioning Reactor
Approved August 26, 2002
When the plant was shut down they "gutted" security - down to two armed responders per shift. It is important to note this is less than even the current DBT.
Alarms were taken off fences. The woods are close to the fence line. He believes that it would take about 20 seconds for a terrorist to get from outside the single, unalarmed perimeter fence to the spent fuel pool.
The restrictions on the use of deadly force is a major problem. If someone comes over the fence with a backpack, and no visible gun - the guard can't shoot. He reports to the Sgt., and the Sgt. cannot order a guard to shoot, so the guard is virtually on his own. If they can't intercept the terrorist before he gets inside the spent fuel pool, the guards can only call the local police.
He believes there is no way terrorists could be intercepted prior to their access to the spent fuel pool.
These guards no longer have semi-automatic rifles. Prior to 9/11, the security plan was being downgraded so that the guards would be totally unarmed, and completely dependant on the state police for response. Until 9/11, they only had hand guns. Now they have shotguns. They have flak jackets [bulletproof vest] only to repel handgun fire, but they don't wear them. "They are worthless."
The only shooting they do is during their annual qualification on their hand gun and shotgun. There is no tactical training at all.
"If an attack took place, most of the guards would run like hell." The morale is "lousy because of the overtime and wages." The experienced guards are looking for other jobs because the current job is a dead end - at some point, they will have all the fuel in casks and moved out. They can't get qualified guards because it's a dead end job. Less than one-third of the force has prior military or law enforcement experience.
Their security plan expects them to hold off the terrorists until outside responders arrive, which at best are six state troopers arriving supposedly within half and hour. This has never been tested, and he believes it would be closer to an hour. Some of the State police have shot guns, others only have handguns. He said that both the guard and state police shot guns are ineffective beyond 100 yards.
They only have paper drills, no force-on-forces.
Appendix C
Statement by Guard C.
Approved August 26, 2002
There is no retirement plan. There is a 401k, but the utility does not match it. Most guards cannot afford family health insurance. Morale is very low.
Ten to twelve guards are looking for jobs in airport security. About 20% of the guards have four or more years of experience. Over 60% have less than one year experience.
Because of morale problems, one experienced guard at this facility believes that between 70% and 80% of the guards would drop their weapons and leave if the plant were attacked.
Between annual firearms qualifications, there is no target practice. Currently they are on 12 hour shifts - five to six days a week. There is a problem with staying alert. Often they don't get days off.
This guard thinks OSRE was "totally artificial." Months of training, guards not usually at the posts in the area of attack, no multiple entries, no diversions.
Outside responders are two utility guards who are relatively close to the plant. They have never exercised with outside responders.
There have been discussions about using off-shift guards in a crisis - but they have caller ID and would not answer the phone. If they did respond, they would come unarmed - so it is a worthless plan.
They have M-16 semi-automatic rifle, shotguns and handguns. Some only have access to shotguns. They have flak jackets [bulletproof vests], which only protect them against handguns. They do not wear them.
The use of deadly force doctrines are a problem. They would have deep trouble with a guy with a backpack scaling the fence. They at least need signs on the fence warning people deadly force would be used if unauthorized entry.
With the confusion over deadly force, they have a saying, "I'd rather by tried by 12, than carried by six." Meaning, they would shoot first and go before a jury, rather than be carried in a coffin by 6 pallbearers.
Appendix D
Statement by Guard D.
Approved September 7, 2002
To be a guard requires a two income family. Because he's worried about his safety, he bought private life insurance. He's concerned about disability benefits, as they would only pay about $1000/month, which is barely enough for his mortgage. If disabled, he believes he'd lose his house in six months.
Things have improved significantly since 9/11. The plant got a new person in charge of security with a military background. The plant has tripled the size of their guard force since then. The economy in the area has been so bad that recruiting has been easy.
He believes about 50% of the guard forces have military or law enforcement background. They do force-on-force drills quarterly with mock guns and controllers. He believes they should use laser or paint ball systems to test security too.
They are starting to create and train an adversary team. He believes it was questionable whether they could have defeated the DBT prior to 9/11. Now they are confident they could defeat even a more robust DBT using special forces as the adversary.
They can't depend on outside responders. Tabletop tests have shown about a two hour response time.
Use of deadly force is still a problem. They do not have a firing range at the plant.
They are on 12-hour shifts, working 49 hours one week, and 36 hours the next. During outages, they do work 72 hours in a week.
They only fire their weapons annually, during their qualification, lasting around two hours.
Appendix E
Statement by Guard E.
Approved August 23, 2002
He was in the military for seven years, and was hired after 9/11. The plant has increased the number of guards since 9/11 by 30%.
They have 9mm handguns, shotguns and AR-15 rifles. Over 50% of the guard force is former military or law enforcement. The average age of the guard force is around 50. Many have 12-19 years experience.
Some are happy with the benefits. However there is no retirement plan and you must pay a portion of the health coverage.
Morale is relatively strong. He believes the guards would probably stick around in the event of an attack.
The plant is in a rural area where there are not many other jobs. He thinks most of the more experienced guards stay for the health benefits. They do not want to have to leave the area for better jobs.
They had an OSRE test in the late 90s. The guards who were there at the time say they passed after having geared up substantially. They hired a security consultant and conducted a huge number of drills in preparation.
He is aware of the "combat effectiveness" issues from his military experience. Their initial losses, in force-on-force drills have been heavy, and would seriously degrade the guard force's ability to respond. He believes this would be a real problem. He has raised the issue with management and during training sessions, but management has not addressed the issue.
"There's a real problem with alertness." They have gone to three eight-hour shifts. "There's a major problem with guards sleeping - especially on the night shift." They have installed computers on post to keep guards awake. "It's better to have them surfing the internet than falling asleep."
The spent fuel pool is between the reactors and about 150 feet from the perimeter double fence. The pool is above ground and could definitely be hit from outside the fence line.
If the terrorist used grenades inside one of the target buildings, it would be devastating - bleeding ears, etc.
Confusion over the use of deadly force is a huge problem. "You need to make split second decisions whether to shoot or not shoot that could save your life." Once while he was on duty a person drove past a check point, despite the lights and sirens, and toward the secure area. The car got all the way to the secure area, turned around and sped out. Because they were not allowed to shoot at the car, he got away before they could stop him. They are taught if an intruder enters the grounds, unless he wields a weapon and the guard believes his life or the life of another is in danger, the guard can only observe and report the incident. He says, "If you pull your trigger, you're on your own, and you'll need a good lawyer."
The guards are not happy with the artificiality of force-on-force drills at the plant, using rubber guns, flashlights and umpires. He thinks they should use the MILES [laser tag] equipment he used in the military.
He can not believe the DBT have not been upgraded.
Every six weeks they do some shooting at their range, and have an annual qualification. Up until the last few weeks they did not have gas masks. Two weeks ago is the first time they fired a weapon with it on.
The Sheriff and State Police troopers believe they can be there within 10-15 minutes. They have never practiced with outside responders, and have never tested the response timelines.
Generally, during their force-on-force exercises, the attack is over - one way or the other - in less than five minutes. So outside responders are useless.
Appendix F
Statement by Guard F.
Approved September 3, 2002
He served in the military 20 years.
"The NEI is fooling the public, which is outrageous." NEI claims a guard gets 270 hours of training before beginning his job. "Maybe if you add the training hours of all the guards together."
The security at the plant is not adequate, and he can't believe that it is any different at any of the other plants.
He thinks the current DBT is stupid.
The company pays for life insurance for the guards. The coverage is $25,000, with an additional $25,000 for accidental death, but he does not know if being killed by a terrorist counts as "accidental."
Guards are required to fire their weapon twice a year, including qualification. He has the option of shooting two additional times on company time. Actual shooting time is one to one and a half hours per occasion.
He believes the number of hours of weapons training is irrelevant or is a moot issue, though, because a guard can be an excellent shot, but if he is out-gunned, he dies. Even if the company hires more guards, if they are still out-gunned it just means that there are more guards to die. For instance, two guys in Los Angeles wearing body armor and carrying automatic weapons and a hell of a lot of ammunition took on the LA cops, who were equipped with shotguns and pistols. The two guys killed seven cops and almost got away.
It is impossible to keep the terrorists out of key buildings until help arrives. The outside responders are never performance tested. They can not get there in time because the battle is over in five minutes.
The tactic is to fall back and protect the vital areas. But if you do fall back, you are out of luck. Grenades tossed into an enclosed space will be a real problem - they cause bleeding ears at the least. If the terrorists get inside the reactor building, they can go anywhere from there. You have to engage the terrorists in the open with equal or superior firepower.
The radio procedure is also a problem. At the beginning of each shift, the guards are required to do a radio check. The terrorists could listen in, and they would then know how many guards were on and where those guards are.
Appendix G
Statement by Guard G.
Approved September 5, 2002
He works for Wackenhut. A number of guards are applying for jobs as baggage screeners, because of better pay and hours.
"Morale is low. Most guards are fed up."
In the past, they worked 12-hour shifts six days a week to get ready for an OSRE test. They are now working this same kind of schedule after 9/11. They have increased the size of the force, but are also putting in outrageous amounts of overtime. Fatigue is clearly a problem.
They just stay below the NRC limit of working 72 hours in one week so they are in compliance with regulations.
They recently nearly doubled the guard force and were given AR-15 semi-automatic rifles. Until then, they only had shotguns.
The only required practice shooting is during their annual qualification, but they can go to the practice range an additional three times with pay. But, because of the overtime and scheduling, very few do. They spend about two to three hours a year practicing with their weapons.
Their only moving target practice is with a figure dragged across the range.
There are no National Guards at the plant. Their inability to defeat the current DBT is problematic. Even still the guards are concerned that the DBT is too low.
Deadly force rules are a major problem - they are only allowed to observe and report an attack.
He believes the nuclear industry does not believe there is a threat, and that the guard force is treated as a drain on profits.
Appendix H., I., and J.
Statement by Guards H., I., and J.
Approved April 2002
Inadequate Number of Guards, Equipment, and Training
The number of guards required at their plant - and they suspect all of the country's nuclear power plants - is inadequate to protect the plant from terrorists. National Guardsmen were posted outside their plant after Sept. 11 but anti-terrorist training has not been stepped-up, otherwise.
The number of armed guards at their plant was actually reduced by 20% several years ago after a successful test of the plant's armed response capability by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The test was conducted by the NRC's Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation (OSRE) program. The number of guards has ramped up since Sept. 11 but is still insufficient.
The number of vehicles provided to the guards to conduct patrols is inadequate.
Contrary to the images in full-page advertisements that have been running recently in Washington D.C., the guards at their plant are equipped with 9-millimeter pistols. The ads, sponsored by the Nuclear Energy Institute, the nuclear power trade group, lead Congress and the public to believe the guards at nuclear power plants are roaming the plants equipped with automatic or semi-automatic weapons and flak jackets.
Their utility falsely claims that armed guards are at its security center at all times but those guards often are used by the utility for many other functions, such as escorting trucks and visitors, and are not always in a posture to respond to a threat or attack. Sometimes these other duties result in the perimeter guard shacks being left unmanned.
To give the impression that the plant is better protected than it is, their utility falsely claims some of its employees other than guards are armed. These employees have had firearms training but have no immediate access to firearms.
Even though the Nuclear Energy Institute's ads claim that the guards at nuclear power plants are "well-compensated," the guards claim that they are the lowest paid workers at their plant, ranking below even forklift operators, janitors and storeroom employees who hand out equipment. Considering the ultimate sacrifice they are asked to make, namely their lives in the event of an attack, the guards believe they should be given more resources for training, equipment and salaries.
Unrealistic Testing
The mock attack OSRE tests staged by the NRC are unrealistic.
The utilities are notified months in advance - often as many as six to 10 months - that an OSRE test will be conducted.
The NRC requires OSRE tests only once every eight years. This is clearly inadequate to ensure security and compliance. The guards have not been notified any more OSRE tests are planned in the near future at their plant.
The utilities are allowed to choose what kind of scenario they want conducted during the OSRE tests and the target of the attack. They practice repeatedly for that particular scenario, often with the help of consultants hired to train the guards for that particular kind of attack.
Their utility picks its best guards for its OSRE tests, meaning the guards who participate in the tests are not representative of the actual guard force. Plus, guards are given overtime to prepare for and engage in the mock tests. They are not normally given so much overtime, making the exercise all the more contrived because more guards are available during testing periods than on typical days.
An OSRE test done a few years ago at the guards' plant did not equip the mock terrorists with 50-caliber armored piercing incendiary (API) sniper fire though any relatively sophisticated terrorist group would most likely use these rifles.
The OSRE tests assume the guards will prevent terrorists from entering the reactor or spent fuel pond buildings and therefore do not even test any scenarios in which they are able to gain access to these sensitive areas. If terrorists do get inside these buildings, the guard force has inadequate manpower to protect them.
If terrorists get inside a control room, the guards depend on state and local police and sometimes federal law enforcement officials to respond. At their plant, it could take up to two hours. However, generally, these battles would be over in a matter of minutes.
The OSRE tests done at their plant do not consider the possibility that terrorists would use diversionary attacks – such as placing remote control explosive devices at one location and attacking another. If that happened, the guards would most likely be told to leave their posts and react to the diversion.
Other Concerns
Utilities like to crow that they are "in compliance," but even when nuclear power plants are technically in compliance with federal regulations, they often would not be able to guard against terrorist attacks. "Being in compliance doesn't mean that the plant could stop someone from breaking in," one longtime guard said.
Security is focused on the reactors while not enough attention is paid to the vulnerability of the spent fuel pools. At their plant, the spent fuel pools are in concrete block structures outside the containment buildings. The guards believe that it would take a group of terrorists only about 60 seconds to reach the highly dangerous spent fuel pools from the security fences.
The utility does not assume the worst case scenario through vulnerability assessments or use computer simulated Joint Tactical Simulations (JTS) to determine the best defensive tactics. Both are used extensively by the military and the federal Department of Energy.
Addendum to Statement by Guard H. Approved August 29, 2002
Firearms training requires only that the guards be capable of standing and kneeling and hitting a stationary target 25 yards away with their handguns; 15 and 25 yards away with their shotguns; and 50, 75 and 100 yards for rifles; and that they are only qualified on a shooting range once a year. This is the state mandated firearms course. Their tactical training consists of 200 yards on the ground stationary for 10 rounds, and on a platform stationary from 200 yards for 10 rounds.
The only time they are required to shoot their weapons is during this annual qualification - which typically lasts a total of six hours. Actual time shooting a weapon is about two hours per year. Guards have only had minimal training or practice in shooting at a moving target with their handgun - approximately ten rounds. That is the only practice they get shooting at moving targets. The guards have never practiced the effect of firing a weapon from inside their bullet resistant enclosure. They are told by state police that it is so loud, they would be rendered useless without hearing protection. None of these procedures have ever been practiced.
Armed guards are now required to accompany some visiting trucks coming onto nuclear power plant sites. There are often no extra guards available for that duty and so guards are either called in on overtime, or they are pulled from their defensive posture post to accompany the trucks. When this happens, even though the facility may be in compliance, there is a hole in the defensive posture.
Armed guards are almost routinely sent home to go down to the minimum number of armed guards and still be in compliance with NRC regulations. The contractor is ordered by the utility to go to this minimal compliance requirement in order to cut costs. He is angry that the state taxpayers have to foot the bill for the state police, local law enforcement and National Guards around the perimeter, while the utility is sending home armed security guards on a regular basis.
In November of 2002, two months after 9/11, the utility's security manager admitted that if a terrorist attack happened, "they (the terrorists) would come trained and armed to the hilt, and the plant would be wiped out in 20 minutes." This same security manager was responsible for setting up the defensive strategy at the plant.
After three years on the job, guards are paid less than the custodians who work at the plant.
Appendix K
Statement by Guard K.
Approved August 29, 2002
In the late 1990s the plant passed an OSRE test and almost immediately, the utility turned the guard force over to a subcontractor. They have not been tested since. The subcontractor reduced the guard force size. While working for the utility, there were over 60 guards. When they were subcontracted out, they were reduced to less than 50.
Once they became a subcontractor they significantly cut the guards' pay. Another plant owned by the same utility has not even given the guards cost of living increases since 1998.
There is about a 30% turnover rate per contract period - approximately 3 ½ years. At another plant owned by the same utility, the turnover rate was over 100% and over 90% of the guard force has only one year of experience. At still another plant owned by the utility, there is a 40-50% turnover rate.
Only a small percentage of the guards have military or law enforcement backgrounds. The guards include a former cocktail waitress and a supermarket checkout boy. Prior to being turned over to the subcontractor, the force was better qualified - with more guard force experience. They had only 4-5 guards with less than 5 years experience, and most of the rest had 10-25 years experience.
They only receive about 40 hours of training before going on shift. There is an annual firearm qualification, and no practice is required during the year. They can practice on their own time, and without pay, but it is difficult to schedule time at the range.
They have handguns, shotguns and semi-automatic M-16s.
After 9/11 there were articles about increased guard forces at the site, but there was no increase. They simply required guards to work 6 12 hour shifts every week. For a while, there were two utility police on the perimeter for visibility, but they were not equipped with rifles.
Morale is bad. Maybe 50% of the guard force would leave if faced with an attack.
For the OSRE test, the adversary force was made up of guards from other plants owned by the same utility and guards from their own guard force.
They only guard against three attackers coming into the facility from one entry point. He believes the guards could never protect the plant against attackers coming from more than one entry point.
They never carried their rifles or semi-automatic weapons until last week. Most weapons are still carried in sealed bags that require a knife to open. Some still have their rifles stored in lockers with padlocks.
Their mobile guards have their guns out of the bags. The guard force recently went to night sites on their M-16s. To train and qualify, they were only given 10 rounds to get used to these new sites. He believed it would take more like 40 hours to get used to these sites. His accuracy was significantly reduced with the use of this new equipment.
They have been told to expect outside help from first responders. What they expect if they are attacked at night, is two local law enforcement officers and one utility officer. They have never performance tested how this would work.
Some local cops have walked through the plant, but the target sets were not explained to them. Guard forces do not take weapons home. If called in a crisis, they come to the plant unarmed, but they are told someone will get weapons to them. Most of the guards live 30 minutes to an hour away from the plant.
For truck bombs, they put up some jersey barriers.
NEI claims the guards are paid the equivalent of GS-9, but that is approximately a $42,000 salary, while the guards' salaries top out, in fact, at about half that amount.
Appendix L
Statement by Guard L.
Approved September 6, 2002
He is a former police officer who works for Wackenhut.
They are on 12-hour shifts, five to six days a week. Recently, a guard fell asleep driving home from the plant after a 12 hour shift. Fatigue and alertness are a real problem. Around guns, this is an additional problem. They have complained to the utility management, the NRC, Wackenhut and OSHA about the fatigue problem, but no one has done anything. If a guard claims he is unfit for duty because of fatigue, he is either sent to a psychiatrist or threatened with it. Some guards have an hour and a half to two hour drives home after these 12 hour shifts.
When they complain to the NRC about various issues, the complaints always just come back to the company Employee Concern program, and nothing happens. "We put no trust in the NRC. They are fooling the public that they are independent from industry."
"Morale - forget about it." The guard turnover is over 50% a year.
They have no rounds in the chambers of their guns. They never practice diversions or multiple entry points.
Recently, they went from shotguns to AR-15s.
They only shoot their guns during annual qualifications. Some want to shoot more, but the company will not pay for the ammunition. They are concerned they will run out of ammunition during a battle. Many guards are lousy shots.
"I've shot at people and been shot at as a cop." He is concerned about the reaction of the other guards during an attack. "Keep in mind targets don't shoot back."
"With the current DBT, single entry, limited terrorist weapons, and the guards are awake, we might be able to win. In a real attack, if the terrorists use snipers, grenade launchers and automatic weapons, we wouldn' t have a chance. Even if they only used more than the current DBT of terrorists we couldn't win."
"The plant perimeter is near a woods, where a sniper could take the guards out, and we wouldn't know what is going on."
About 50% of the guard force has military and law enforcement experience.
Because the guard force feels the management of the utility and Wackenhut do not care about the guards, many in the guard force would leave in an attack. The guards are really worried that if they are in a significant gun fight, they will run out of ammunition.
He is concerned about being taken out by snipers while the guards are in their bullet-resistant guard shacks.
They complained to management about these issues, but they are told "We are in compliance with NRC."
Deadly force is a problem. There's no training on it, and generally they are told just to "observe and report."
They have never been performance tested with outside responders. The plant strategy is "containment" - which means keeping the terrorists inside the plant while waiting for outside help for up to two or three hours. He believes it would take that long for a SWAT team to arrive. The plan is once a SWAT team gets there, they would need to do a "tabletop" exercise first in order to form their attack plan to retake the facility.
Appendix M
Statement by Guard M.
Approved September 9, 2002
He agrees with Guard L's statement and adds:
"Morale has gone to hell." They are on 12-hour shifts 5-6 days a week.
They lost their training department. 20-25 guards are applying for jobs at Customs and airport security.
He has complained weekly to the onsite NRC representative about the force being fatigued and under-manned, but gets no response.
He even met with management of the utility. They tell him "We are in compliance. We are a profit-making company that produces electricity."
There is a huge turnover rate. 60-70% of the guard force has under one year of experience.
He believes 50% of the guard force would take off in a terrorist attack.
They ramped up significantly for their OSRE test, and then let guards go.
They are building 25 foot guard towers, which are death traps because they would be vulnerable to sniper rifles. When he complains to management, he is told "Sniper rifles are not in the rules."
There is a new class of guards being trained. At the end of the training they get a $500 bonus. He has been told by 70% of the trainees, they are planning to leave once they get their bonus. This is because once they spent a day on the job training and saw the actual conditions they would be working under, they don't want the job. "They simply can't keep guards."
They only shoot at annual requalification. They get about 2-3 hours of actual shooting a year.
He believes they would be seriously out-gunned in an attack.
Appendix N
Statement of Guard N
March 29, 2002
I am writing this letter to focus your attention on serious problems with the security in the nuclear industry. I have no political agenda and take no position in the debate over nuclear power. My only concern is for the safety and protection of Seabrook nuclear power plant and power plants throughout the country.
On November 13, 2001, I was hired by Burns International Staffing Services, a security company subcontracted by North Atlantic Power Company (owner of Seabrook nuclear power station). I was hired as an armed security officer to work at the Seabrook station. During the interview for this position, I was told that as a security officer I would become part of a tactically proficient, well-trained security team. This seemed to me liked a great opportunity to excel in the security field and receive training that could be applied to other careers. I was also informed that since the security force was on heightened alert it was working a lot of overtime (12 hour shifts, 5 to 6 days a week) and that we (me and 14 others) were hired to alleviate that. When we were done training everyone would be going back to 8 hour shifts with some overtime between 40-48 hours a week.
The first two days of training was just a basic introduction to the plant. On day three it became clear that the training department was not prepared for a class of this size and things became disorganized. It stayed that way throughout the training process. In the weeks to come, the class would progress through RAD worker training and an array of computer based training regarding safety with all the assorted hazards one might encounter in the work environment. Classroom courses included Communication, Incident Report, Barrier Inspection, Use of Force, Public Relations, Contraband Detection Equipment, Patrol Techniques, Entry Control Procedures, Personnel Search, Vehicle Access, Security Cordon, Alarm Assessment, Response to Bomb Threat, and Search for Missing Officer. Near the end of all these classes, we went out to the range for pistol training and qualifications.
For pistol training, we had three instructors and a class of 16. Over the course of two days I shot 96 rounds through my weapon before I was told that it was time for me to qualify. I informed the instructor that I did not feel comfortable with my weapon. I pleaded with the instructor to let me have more time with this firearm. He tried to comfort me telling me not to worry - that I would qualify. I explained to him that I was not worried about qualifying; I was worried with the fact that this was a strange weapon to me and I was not used to it yet and that my life and the life of other officers, not to mention the public's safety, depends on it. Firing 96 rounds does not make an individual proficient with this weapon. He agreed with me and said he wished he had more time to give me but I had to qualify now, there was no more time. I had one more day of range training for the shotgun.
In the final week, we began tactical training - the most important part of training. We were allotted four days to go over tactical mind set, survival response, tactical communication, basic individual tactics, response force deployment tactics, team tactics, close quarters techniques, tactical weapons techniques, and an introduction to tactical team movement. Here we were going to learn the skills that would prepare us for an attack on the facility. There was one trainer assigned for this task. Three security officers who had previously missed this part of the training were added to the class. By chance, two of them had prior military background but no trainer certification. These two officers were asked to assist in the training even though they themselves had not gone though the plant's tactical class. I feel that this resulted in a lot of inconsistencies in the training. We had three individuals teaching three different points of view on tactics that they learned in three different fields.
On the last day of tactics training we were to demonstrate our ability to implement what we were taught. The class was split into two teams, many of my teammates failed repeatedly trying to demonstrate the things we had learned. The other team was completely neutralized in the first two minutes of their exercise, which was the only opportunity they had to demonstrate what they learned. Both teams suffered multiple mistakes basically because of our inability to apply what we had learned. This was brought to the attention of the instructor and the response was, it was ok, they were just trying to give us the basics. That was the end of tactical training.
I would encourage you to ask any law enforcement, SWAT team, or military Special Forces if they feel that this level of training over four days would make them proficient enough with their weapons and techniques to engage multiple well-trained, dedicated, armed adversaries (as outlined by the NRC in its DBT). I would venture to guess that those organizations would agree that this training would be insufficient.
The next phase of training was on-the-job training (OJT). Basically OJT is for the students to physically do what they were taught in the classroom, demonstrating the ability to do the job. The majority of OJT was spent learning all the door numbers and locations. This took about two weeks to complete. Now mind you that at this point, the class had gone through weeks of classroom training, three days of fire arms training, and four days of tactical training, but had yet to actually see the inside of the plant or even had the plant's tactical plan explained to them. Two days before we were to be put on shift, the tactical trainer explained the tactical plan for the plant. We spent one day going over the plan on a tabletop blueprint of the plant and the other day we walked around to see all the response points that we would be required to get to in the event of a contingency. To spend eight hours playing tabletop games and about four hours walking around looking at the response points does not give an individual enough time to fully understand and grasp his or her responsibilities. Once again this was brought to the instructor's attention. He said that when we got to shift we would do drills based on the DBT so we would fully understand the tactical plan. So basically they were setting the whole new class of 15 individuals on security post knowing that we didn't have the ability to protect the facility, with the hope that the plant wouldn't be attacked before they could run enough drills to teach us the tactical plan. One of the problems with this (this is just one of many) is that the shift you're on will effect the number of drills you will be involved in. Day shift can only drill on weekends and night shift on Wednesday and Thursday. Night shift has more drill time because there are less people in the plant, but day shift hardly ever sees any drills.
Now in the final phase of OJT, they required us to sign off on all our training. When you sign off you're saying you know how to do all the tasks that will be required of you in the field. But how can you sign off saying you know how to do something in the field when you have never been in the field to do it? But they won't let you in the field to learn it until you sign off on it. This whole process seems to be designed to take all liability from the company and put it on the security officers. This is the first of many hard decisions I had to make. It did not sit well with me that I had to sign off on training that I felt was far below adequate. I could either sign off or resign. I did not want to resign, so I signed off and hoped nothing went wrong on shift.
My first night on shift was uneventful. I met some of the other officers but mostly I just felt my way around, getting my feet wet so to speak. Night two was when we started the drills; this would be the first set of drills at the plant in more than six months. This was my first chance to see how the tactical plan was going to work, for me to implement everything I had been taught. For these drills, you are given a whistle and you use your flashlight. The whistle represents the gunshot and the flashlight the bullet. They told us what time the drill would start so we would be ready. We had three drills that night though the first two I only heard over the radio because the drill was in a different part of the plant. They killed multiple officers and blew up a number of vital components, and in at least one of the drills, they got a complete target set which would have resulted in a melt down.
On the third drill they came at my post. I was posted in the radiological controlled area (RCA). They came in through a door that only requires a crowbar to open it. There were only two attackers and they were upon us in under a minute and easily killed me and another officer with grenades. The room we were guarding was one of the two ways into the reactor itself. Once we were dead they had a clear path into the reactor - the plant would've melted down again. And while doing all this, the adversaries did not lose a single guy. This was an eye opener for me; I was highly alarmed by the results of the drills. The next night we had three more drills. I was posted outside with two other officers who had worked there for more than a year. The first drill started on the other side of the plant and finished in my area. The adversaries in this drill had hit all the target sets they needed and still had one person alive so once again the plant was melted down. The next two drills had about the same results - all three of us died outside and they melted down the plant.
So over the last two nights we had six drills and the drill team had succeeded in having some sort of radiological release in nearly every drill. I was very concerned with this and started talking to all my superiors about the obvious problem. The response that I got from them was that this was the reason behind all the drills, to make the officers better at their tactics. I pointed out that we just lost six drills over two nights which included officers that had been there for years. I thought that we were suppose to be a team working together but that was not team work out there; that was chaos. There were officers that did not get to their response points. We had officers that did not even know where their response points were and, if that was not bad enough, we had officers shooting other officers by mistake. If we were to be attacked right now we would fail - the whole shift had just demonstrated that. That's why we need to do more drills, was the only response I received.
These six drills were the only drills I had at Seabrook nuclear station. Over the next few weeks I talked to officers, superiors, anyone who would listen, about the problems of the plant. Talking with all these people, I started to see something more alarming then everything else - over the whole guard force there was an attitude of complacency. Everyone saw the problems, some had tried to solve them, but basically no one knew what to do. Some of the officers believe that most of the posts are basically suicide because every time they have a drill, they are killed in those posts. These same officers said that if the plant is attacked they are going to use their weapons to get off the plant. Then there are some who would stay and fight but who feel that training is inadequate and don't quite understand what they are suppose to do in the event of an attack, and other individuals who just feel that the plant will never be attacked.
I had talked to everyone that I could. I went through the chain of command in management and got no results. They either can't or won't change anything. Once again I faced a hard choice: Do I stay and try to change things from within, or do I resign? Resigning would not solve the problems and wouldn't help me sleep any better at night. This job was supposed to be a career for me; I was going to be a highly trained, highly paid individual. I wanted to take the experience I would receive and apply it to something better further down the road. On top of that, this plant is in my backyard so what happens here is going to effect me whether I work there or not. So by working there, I thought I could help control what happened to my family, friends, and home. Every night that I went to work I looked at the officers on post with me to determine what I would do in the event of an attack. Some nights I felt very confident about our chances of stopping it. Other nights, I too would use my weapons to get off the plant. And sometimes I just plain feared for my life, praying that we wouldn't be attacked. Many nights went by like this when I realized that I too had developed that same level of complacency that I had found so alarming weeks before. I was saying the same things those officers were saying - I too was willing to run if there was an attack. With that attitude, I was no longer helping; I had become part of the problem. This realization ultimately forced me to resign.
As I mentioned before, Seabrook power plant is in my backyard. Regardless of whether I work there, I am affected by its presence like thousands of Americans throughout the country who live near power plants. Since my resignation, I have decided to publicize my story in the hope that it will inspire reform to the system. I am anxious to work with any policy maker or journalist who shares my concern for the safety of the American public.
Sincerely,
John Middlemiss
Appendix O
Statement of Guard O.
March 29, 2002
I am writing this letter to inform you and the public of a serious problem in our country today regarding the security at nuclear power plants.
On November 13, 2001, I joined a class of 15 employees under contract with Burns Security to commence training and gain a position as a armed security guard at Seabrook Nuclear Power Station in Seabrook, NH. When I went for my interview for employment I was led to believe by gaining employment in this position, I would become part of a well-trained, tacitly proficient Tactical Response Team. This seemed like a great opportunity to excel in an up-and-coming field given the current events.
I was told that given the current state of heightened alert of the nation the guards at Seabrook Station had been working a lot of overtime. We were being hired to help with that situation.
We started classes on a hectic schedule where it seemed to me and the majority of the class that it was sort of a fly by the seat of your pants operation. When asked about it, the training staff apologized and stated they were not prepared for a class of this size and to please bear with them through the duration. We progressed through a variety of training including classroom courses covering several topics and weapons qualification. Needless to say, the two days they had allotted for weapons qualification was not nearly enough time and was extended for individuals who could not qualify in that amount of time. I qualified on the second day of range training and that was the extent of my firearms training on the pistol. We were given one more day for shot guns and that was it.
I made it known to the trainers that I was not comfortable with the gun and did not believe that I was proficient enough with the gun to be able to engage multiple adversaries on the move with much success. This is doubly concerning because though I was uncomfortable with the weapon, I still achieved the highest qualification score in the class. The response of the training staff was that they would like to give us more training but couldn't because of time constraints. I was informed that we would not be firing our service weapons again until the annual qualifications. When I asked how I was to remain proficient with the firearm, I was told that I could go out on my own time and dime to do so if I felt the need. It is my opinion that individuals expected to defend a nuclear power plant should be required to be proficient with their weapons, and it is the responsibility of the security company, not the guards, to make sure that is the case. To do otherwise is irresponsible and certainly not in the best interest of the general public.
Then finally in the last weeks of our six week training regiment we started tactical training. The first thing our trainer said to us regarding tactical training was that he wished that he could spend six weeks with us but that the company would only allot four days towards that application. To me, this was the most important part of the training we could receive. In these four days, the fifteen of us were to learn the tactics necessary to defend the plant and our lives in the event of an attack. There was one trainer for this task and he asked two of the plant guards with previous military background, but no trainer certification, to help in the instruction. Those guards, at the time, had worked at the plant for less than six months and had not gone through the plant's tactical class themselves. We received some basic training and were divided into two groups to demonstrate that we had mastered those basics. The team of eight that I was on had one attempt to demonstrate what we had learned. In that attempt, our team was neutralized entirely in the first two minutes of the exercise due to a lack of cohesion and because many of the basics we had been taught were not applied. This showed me that our team was not proficient with tactics and did not retain the instruction.
I brought my opinion up to the instructor and was told that it was alright because he was just trying to give us the bare essentials and that when we got on shift we would do more realistic tactical training. It seems to me that it is crucial that the active guards protecting the power plant be fully trained before they get there. In one month we had drills only one day, which I did not take part in. The additional training I was promised was nowhere in sight.
As time progressed, I became more and more aware of an unprecedented level of disatisfaction among the guard force. As I talked to more guards and became acquainted with them, I began to realize their disatisfaction was well founded: they had been working 60-72 hours a week for a long period of time, they had their Christmas bonuses taken from them, they were using what some of them called antiquated weapons, and they had received no recognition for their efforts.
At the same time, North Atlantic bought a number of new weapons though they couldn't be used because there was no time to train the guards who were already working so much overtime. When I asked the security manager of North Atlantic when we would have time to qualify with the new guns he told me not until after the shutdown, probably around June. I asked what he was doing to alleviate the overtime problem and was told that the chief was hiring more guards. But the chief told me he was hiring only two more guards to replace two guards who had left the plant. When I pointed out that this would not help the overtime problem, he seemed unconcerned. He went on to tell me that the security department had several other priorities that needed to be addressed first.
After showing my dissatisfaction, I was told that the job isn't for everyone and what I did was up to me. I told them that if I did not get some assurance that they would try and resolve some of the problems (disgruntled armed guards, unsecured and ineffective barriers, and inadequate training, to name a few) that I was going to resign for fear of my own safety. I was told by the security manager that he would pass it along to his superiors because he himself did not have the authority to do anything about it. I asked him if he saw any resolutions happening in the near future. The response was these things take time. I told him that my position was that given current events and the almost weekly advisories from the intelligence community regarding threats to nuclear power plants, it is our responsibility to do what we can to enhance security beyond what is required in the interest of the safety and security of the American people. I got the feeling that I was getting nowhere in the conversation and felt that the security manager was not really concerned about the issues that I had brought to his attention. For the most part, he shifted blame for his lack of action to those around him. It was at that point I decided to terminate my employment for said reasons.
Now I am currently unemployed and collaborating with another ex-Seabrook armed guard to try to make people and government aware of the extent of the problem at hand. The government should impose more stringent oversight of the NRC and push them to upgrade their security requirements and military strategists should independently evaluate plant security. Furthermore, I believe the National Guard should temporary be brought on site to support the current guard force until the NRC and individual plants can improve security. Essentially what it boils down to is that nothing will change without more stringent requirements and oversight. We need to be proactive in these times where our enemies have brought war to our soil. We can't afford to wait and see. Every American citizen has an obligation to stand up to the challenge and make this country safe or as safe as we can regardless of the financial cost.
Sincerely,
James Howard
Appendix P
Statement of Guard P.
Approved
He is a former military MP and police officer. He has "shot people and been shot at." He has been on the guard force for over eight years.
He has relayed his concerns about security problems, as well as fatigue issues through the chain of command - Wackenhut and utility management. No action was taken. He has not gone to the NRC yet.
The guard turnover rate is high. 70% of the guard force has less than two years experience, 50% has less than one year.
Until very recently, they only had hand guns and shotguns with 19 rounds, and they did not carry their shotguns. They just received AR-15s.
One of his major concerns are the Bullet Resistant Enclosures (BREs). Outside, they are elevated. He believes they are death traps. They cost about $50,000 a piece. He believes 50 caliber API rounds or RPGs would take them out.
The guards believe the terrorists will come with automatic weapons, sniper rifles, grenades and RPGs etc. The guards would be seriously outgunned, and will not have a chance. The BRE's inside are wedge shaped. He believes a grenade would blow them off their anchors, and on top of the guard.
In the response scenarios, guards depend on outside responders - which will take about 2 hours to respond. This has never been tested though.
He has a major concern about running out of ammunition.
During an outage, a properly cleared worker uses his badge to allow several uncleared workers with visitors badges to "piggy-back" on his badge.
NRC does compliance inspections from time-to-time. "But compliance doesn't mean you can stop a terrorist."
Prior to 9/11, from time-to-time the utility would conduct training exercises using 4-5 terrorists from two entry points. Since 9/11, however, now they are only using three terrorists from one entry point. He can not get an answer why they have downgraded the training.
They only shoot their weapons during annual requalification, about 2-3 hours per year. They have a number of guards currently that can not qualify, including a supervisor. "The utility is only concerned about the bottom line." They have spent millions on equipment - but it was the wrong equipment, like the BREs.
They run their exercises with rubber guns and whistles.
Appendix Q
Statement Q
by National Guardsman Called Up to Protect Nuclear Power Plant
Approved September 7, 2002
He was assigned to perimeter security at a nuclear power plant since 9/11. He is a supervisor in his National Guard unit with Special Operations training.
He believes it would take a terrorist 45 to 60 seconds to get into a spent fuel pool.
He is concerned that he can see all of the bullet-resistant guard shacks on two sides of the plant from his vantage outside the perimeter fence with a 50 caliber sniper rifle with API rounds. He claims he could kill every guard on two sides of the plant from outside the fence line. He has raised this concern with power plant security, and they recognize the problem, but have not done anything about it.
He believes the National Guardsmen are "sitting ducks in the face of a sophisticated terrorist attack" the way they are currently deployed even though their guns are loaded.
The utility has not briefed his unit on the location of the target sets needed to be protected, claiming they do not have a need to know.
Appendix R
August 27, 2002 Letter to The Honorable James M. Jeffords, Chairman, Senate Committee on Environment and Public works from NRC Chairman Richard Meserve. Click Here to see the letter.
Appendix S
Nuclear Energy Institute Advertisements: "More Than Strong Fences," January 16, 2002 and "Vigilant," June 5, 2002.
Appendix T
September 3, 2002 Letter to Commissioner Edward McGaffigan, Jr., Nuclear Regulatory Commission, from Harold W. Keiser, President and Chief Nuclear Officer, PSEG Nuclear LLC. Click Here to see the letter.
Appendix U
June 15, 1982 Letter to All Licensees of Operating Plants, Applicants for an Operating License, and Holders of Construction Permits from Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director, Division of Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Click Here to see the document.
Appendix V
Collective Bargaining Agreements for Security Guards and Pay Scales for Janitors at the Same Plants. Follow the links to view the document Appendix V.
Appendix W
January 26, 2000 Memorandum from Teri M. Wigger, Regional Investigator, Region II, Occupational Safety and Health Administration; and February 8, 2000 Letter to Patricia B. Marmon, Director EEO/AA Programs, The Wackenhut Corporation from Patricia K. Clark, Regional Administrator, Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Click Here to see the letter.
Appendix X
Salary Comparisons. Click Here to see the document.