Endnotes for POGO's report:
U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Y-12 and Oak Ridge National Laboratory at High Risk, October 16, 2006
1. On the site visit to Y-12 were POGO’s Executive Director Danielle Brian, Senior Investigator Peter Stockton, and unpaid consultant Ron Timm. Ms. Brian did not attend the site visit to ORNL.
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2. Ferguson, Charles. The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism. Monterey Institute of International Studies Center for Nonproliferation Studies, CA, 2004. Foreword.
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3. The Monterey Institute of International Policy Studies’ Center for Nonproliferation Studies is an affiliate institution of Middlebury College. It contains four graduate schools, multiple research centers, and numerous special programs. The Center for Nonproliferation Studies is the largest non-governmental organization in the world devoted to curbing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and is the only organization dedicated exclusively to graduate education and research on nonproliferation issues.
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4. Four Faces, pp 321-322.
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5. “Over 50 Reports, Hearings, Testimonies and Commissions in the Past Five Years Concluding that DOE has Serious Security Problems.” Project On Government Oversight, January 22, 2002. http://www.pogo.org/p/environment/eo-020114-nuclear.html.
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6. Two departments in the Department of Energy have responsibility for nuclear weapons facilities: NNSA, which oversees seven nuclear weapons sites, including Y-12; and the Office of Energy, Science and the Environment (ESE), which oversees five sites containing weapons-grade nuclear material, including ORNL.
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7. Admiral Mies is a former Commander in Chief of the United States Strategic Command, the unified command responsible for command and control of all U.S. strategic nuclear forces supporting the national security objective of strategic deterrence.
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8. Meis, Admiral Richard W. NNSA SECURITY: An Independent Review. April 2005. http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/reports/2005-05-02_Mies_Executive_Summary_and_Report.pdf. Downloaded October 16, 2006.
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9. The Meis Report was so critical that it was withheld from the public for over a year. On June 29, 2005, POGO requested the report under the Freedom of Information Act. Days prior to releasing the report to POGO, NNSA put out a press release claiming it had implemented 70 percent of Mies’ recommendations. The claim was bizarre given that basic security problems cited in the Mies Report would take years to remedy. “Controversial Nuclear Security Report Released.” Project On Government Oversight, September 2, 2005. http://pogo.org/p/homeland/ha-050901-doe.html/.
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10. Bunn, Matthew. “The Nuclear Campus.” Boston Globe op-ed, October 20, 2005.
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11. An improvised nuclear device (IND) explosion is qualitatively different from a “dirty bomb.” While exploding plutonium or highly enriched uranium with a bomb would cause a major dispersion of highly radioactive materials, as occurred at the Chernobyl Reactor in the Ukraine, an IND explosion could cause a chain reaction on par with the devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan. An IND can be created at a number of DOE sites because of the presence of nuclear weapons or special nuclear materials in bomb-grade quality and quantity. This can cause nuclear detonations of varying sizes. Little time is required to accomplish this act.
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12. For more information about POGO’s investigations into the security of the nuclear weapons complex, visit POGO’s website at http://www.pogo.org/p/x/2004nuclearweapons.html.
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13. Ron Timm, an unpaid consultant to POGO who has contributed to this report, owns the patent on these technologies.
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14. U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Homeland Security Opportunities. Project On Government Oversight, May 2005. http://www.pogo.org/p/homeland/ho-050301-consolidation.html.
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15. In 2001, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld established the Scowcroft Commission, headed by General Brent Scowcroft, to review security of nuclear weapons facilities. The Commission’s report was completed in March 2002 and classified as a top secret document. Despite requests, an unclassified version of the report has never been released to the public. See “Testimony of Danielle Brian, POGO Executive Director.” Hearing before the House Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, September 24, 2002. http://www.pogo.org/p/environment/et-020903-nukepower.html.
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16. The Secretary of Energy Advisory Board (SEAB) was chartered in January 1990 to provide the Secretary with timely, balanced, external advice on issues of importance to the Secretary. Shortly after completion of its report on consolidating the nuclear weapons complex, the Secretary disbanded the Board as of May 20, 2006. http://www.seab.energy.gov/publications/NWCITFRept-7-11-05.pdf. Downloaded October 16, 2006.
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17. Then-DOE Secretary Spencer Abraham appointed the Mies Commission, headed by Admiral Richard Mies, to conduct an independent assessment of security at nuclear weapons facilities. DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration kept the report secret until forced to release it in response to a Freedom of Information Act request from POGO in 2005. http://www.pogo.org/p/homeland/ha-050901-doe.html.
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18. Bunn, Matthew and John P. Holdren. “ A Tutorial on Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear-Explosive Materials: Nuclear Weapons Design and Materials.” Securing the Bomb 2006. Managing the Atom Project, Harvard University. September 6, 2006. http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/overview/technical2.asp. Downloaded October 16, 2006.
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19. The HEU was not dropped from a significant height, and the scientist was able to kick away the piece that was dropped before a reaction could take place.
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20. Alvarez, Luis W. Alvarez: Adventures of a Physicist. Basic Books: New York, 1987. p 125.
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21. Wald, Matthew L. “Suicidal Nuclear Threat Is Seen at Weapon’s Plants.” The New York Times, January 23, 2002.
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22. WMD 411. Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2004. http://www.nti.org/f_wmd411/f1a4_1.html. Downloaded October 16, 2006; and “The Destructive Power of Nuclear Weapons: Hiroshima and Nagasaki.” Nuclear Terrorism Tutorial: Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2005. Chapter 2. http://www.nti.org/h_learnmore/nuctutorial/chapter02_08.html. Downloaded October 16, 2006.
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23. Matthew McKinzie, Ph.D., Scientific Consultant, Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) performed the simulation using the U.S. Department of Defense computer code HPAC (Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability, version 3.2.2).
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24. The calculation assumed that the explosion was caused by a fission reaction, and was at ground level at Y-12 on a clear November day with winds blowing eastward at four meters per second (13.12 feet per second). In this scenario, the most intensely radioactive zone in the fallout plume is calculated to extend no more than 10 miles from the explosion site.
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25. “Oak Ridge National Laboratory Fact Sheet.” UT-Batelle, 2006. http://www.ornl.gov/ornlhome/fact.pdf; and “Y-12 National Security Complex: Fact Sheet.” BWXT Y-12, 2006. http://www.y12.doe.gov/about/factsheet.php. Downloaded October 16, 2006.
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26. The Nuclear Explosion Prompt Effects include the initial blast wave, high winds, heat radiation, thermal radiation, and initial pulse radiation.
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27. The Postulated Threat is the intelligence community’s best estimate of the threat faced by nuclear facilities. This includes the number of adversaries, lethality of their weapons, and the size of a truck bomb that terrorists might use.
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28. Pantex, where nuclear weapons are assembled; Nevada Test Site (which has no nuclear weapons, but was mistakenly included); and the Transportation Division, which transports nuclear weapons.
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29. Since the 1960s, nearly all U.S. nuclear warheads have been equipped with safety locks or “PALs” (Permissive Action Links). If a warhead is stolen, it would be virtually impossible to detonate without a top-secret code.
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30. Nuclear Security: DOE Must Address Significant Issues to Meet the Requirements of the New Design Basis Threat. Government Accountability Office (GAO-04-701T), April 27, 2004. p 12. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04701t.pdf#search=%22gao-04-701T%22. Downloaded October 16, 2006.
31. Ibid. p 8.
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32. “The National Nuclear Security Administration’s Implementation of the 2003 Design Basis Threat.” Department of Energy Office of Inspector General (DOE/IG-0705), October 2005. pp 1-2. http://www.ig.energy.gov/documents/CalendarYear2005/ig-0705.pdf. Downloaded October 16, 2006.
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33. “DOE/ESE Security: How Ready is the Protective Force?” Hearing before the House Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security, July 26, 2005. p 99.
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34. Activated barriers, such as cold smoke and sticky foam, are delay mechanisms that are activated upon any unauthorized entry into areas equipped with them.
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35. POGO makes no judgement as to whether Russian nuclear sites can meet their DBT.
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36. Category I sites are those that have weapons quantities of weapons-grade nuclear materials.
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37. Special Report on ‘The National Nuclear Security Administration’s Implementation of the 2003 Design Basis Threat.’ Department of Energy Office of Inspector General (DOE/IG-0705), October 7, 2005. p 4. http://www.ig.energy.gov/documents/CalendarYear2005/ig-0705.pdf. Downloaded October 16, 2006.
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38. The design-basis blast is the size of explosive the protective force has to be prepared to protect against.
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39. Hertsgaard, Mark. “Nuclear Insecurity.” Vanity Fair, November 2003. p 190.
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40. “Testimony of Linton F. Brooks, Undersecretary for Nuclear Security and NNSA Administrator.” Hearing before the House Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, April 27, 2004. p 9. http://reform.house.gov/UploadedFiles/BrooksAprilTestimony.pdf. Downloaded October 16, 2006.
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41. Allison, Graham. “The Ongoing Failure of Imagination.” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, September/October 2006. http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=so06allison. Downloaded October 16, 2006.
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42. “Y-12 Fact Sheet.” Y-12 National Security Complex, Department of Energy, 2006. http://www.y12.doe.gov/about/factsheet.php. Downloaded October 16, 2006.
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43. “Census 2000 PHC-T-3 Ranking Tables for Metropolitan Areas: 1990 and 2000.” U.S. Census Bureau, April 2, 2001. p 3. http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/phc-t3/tab03.pdf. Downloaded October 16, 2006.
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44. “Y-12 Fact Sheet.” Y-12 National Security Complex, Department of Energy, 2006. http://www.y12.doe.gov/about/factsheet.php. Downloaded October 16, 2006.
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45. Downblending is the process of converting highly enriched uranium into low enriched uranium, which does not pose an IND or theft threat.
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46. At the time that this report went to print, POGO understood that there were at least five armored vehicles (although how well-armored is in question).
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47. POGO understands that, in the last year, the SWAT-capable guards have been outfitted with some of this equipment.
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48. Y-12 claims that it now has outer-perimeter patrols.
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49. Protective Force Contracts at the Oak Ridge Reservation. Department of Energy Office of Inspector General (DOE/IG-0719), February 2006. p 2. http://www.ig.energy.gov/documents/CalendarYear2006/IG-0719.pdf.
Downloaded October 16, 2006.
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50. Protective Force Performance Test Improprieties.” Department of Energy Office of Inspector General (DOE IG/IG-0636), January 2004. p 1. http://www.ig.energy.gov/documents/CalendarYear2004/ig-0636.pdf.
Downloaded October 16, 2006.
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51. “Y-12 bombs security exercise: nuclear weapons plant vulnerable to terrorists, oversight group says.” Knoxville News Sentinel, January 16, 2004.
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52. “Testimony of Glenn S. Podonsky, Director, Officeof Security and Safety Performance Assurance, U.S. Department of Energy.” Hearing before the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, March 18, 2005. http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/Hearings/03182005hearing1457/Podonsky.pdf. Downloaded October 16, 2006.
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53. “Wackenhut Guards Almost Shot During Nuclear Security Test.” POGO Alert, October 23, 2004. http://www.pogo.org/p/homeland/ha-041003-Y12.html; and “Security Drill at Weapons Plant Raises Safety Questions.” The New York Times, December 21, 2004. p 14. http://www.pogo.org/m/hsp/hsp-nytimes-12212004.pdf.
Downloaded October 16, 2006.
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54. Stockton, Peter and Danielle Brian. “Wackenhut’s Witch Hunt Tale.” The Oak Ridger op-ed, November 12, 2004. Downloaded October 16, 2006.
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55. “Live Ammo Round Sparks Investigation.” Knoxville News Sentinel, September 22, 2004.
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56. Brumley, William J., Manager of the Y-12 Site Office. “Contract number DE-AC0500OR22928, Wackenhut Services, Inc. Performance Evaluation Report for the Period January 1, 2005, through June 30, 2005.” August 30, 2005. pp 1. http://seiu23.advocateoffice.com/vertical/Sites/{2FDAD06E-E7D3-4DE0-AEF2-0C787424C292}/uploads/{FBA113EB-4DB9-402E-A787-08E0DC12005A}.PDF.
Downloaded October 16, 2006.
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57. DOE officials confirmed this fact during POGO’s site visit to Y-12. In a number of force-on-force scenarios tested by DOE, even when the protective force is successful in repelling an attack, they lose up to 80-95% of the force. In fact, in early spring 2006, a facility with large amounts of HEU lost 80% of its protective force in a force-on-force test.
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58. Flash-bangs are low-grade explosives meant to disorient without causing serious harm.
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59. There were originally six storage and processing buildings, but DOE states that it de-inventoried one of these buildings in 2006. “Major Relocation of Highly Enriched Uranium Completed at Y-12 National Security Complex.” Y-12 Office News Release, October 2, 2006. http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/newsreleases/2006/PR_2006-10-02_NR-07-06.pdf.
Downloaded October 16, 2006.
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60. On October 15, 2005, and October 28, 2005, POGO sent a Freedom of Information Act request for internal DOE analyses to determine how the decision was made to abandon the underground or berm design in exchange for the above-ground design. POGO has yet to receive any documents responsive to this request. In May 2006, the DOE Oak Ridge Office informed POGO that “the documents you have requested are now under the jurisdiction of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). By copy of this letter, we will forward your request to the NNSA [in Albuquerque, NM] for processing.”
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61. This number was determined through a POGO interview with a White House official.
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62. “Y-12 Awards New HEU Storage Facility Contract.” NNSA News: Department of Energy, October 2004. p 4. http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/newsletters/2004/nl_2004Oct_NNSA_News.pdf#search=%22HEUMF%20%24500%22. Downloaded October 16, 2006.
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63. Munger, Frank. “Lots of Changes Occurring at Y-12: Cost of Biggest Project has increased about $150 Million.” Knoxville News Sentinel, September 18, 2006. p A11.
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64. Facts determined during POGO site visits to Y-12 and the Nevada Test Site.
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65. A platter charge is created by placing explosives on the concave side of a metal plate. The detonation sends the plate through the target.
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66. As mentioned before, Ron Timm holds the patent for the delay mechanisms, cold smoke and sticky foam, mentioned in this analysis.
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67. When POGO visited the HEUMF site in September 2005, the project manager claimed that construction was 30% complete. That seemed questionable since only one wall had been started.
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68. Munger, Frank. “Building Concerns Raised Before Work Was Stopped.” Knoxville News Sentinel, February 2005.
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69. FY2007 Committee Report: Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill, 2007. House Committee on Appropriations, May 19, 2006. p 114.
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_reports&docid=f:hr474.pdf
Downloaded October 16, 2006.
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70. FY07 National Defense Authorization Act Committee Report. House Armed Services Committee, May 5, 2006. p 463. http://www.house.gov/hasc/NDAA2007CommiteeReport.pdf. Downloaded October 16, 2006.
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_reports&docid=f:sr274.109.pdf
Downloaded October 16, 2006; and FY07 Energy and Water Appropriations Bill Committee Report (109-274). Senate Energy and Water Appropriations Committee, June 29, 2006. pp 155-156. http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_reports&docid=f:sr274.109.pdf
Downloaded October 16, 2006.
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71. Rhodes, Richard. The Making of the Atomic Bomb. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986. p 496.
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72. In addition, ORNL stores some stockpiles of neptunium-237, which is a byproduct from plutonium production and is a potential IND material.
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73. “Testimony of Glenn S. Podonsky, Director, Officeof Security and Safety Performance Assurance, U.S. Department of Energy,” Hearing before the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, March 18, 2005.
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74. Protective Force Training at the Department of Energy’s Oak Ridge Reservation. Department of Energy Office of the Inspector General (DOE/IG-0694), June 2005, Letter to the Secretary. p 1. http://ig.energy.gov/documents/CalendarYear2005/ig-0694.pdf
Downloaded October 16, 2006.
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75. Munger, Frank. “Watchdog group, DOE at odds on ORNL security.” Knoxville News-Sentinel. September 30, 2005. p A1.
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76. Letter to Department of Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman. Project on Government Oversight, September 29, 2005.
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77. U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Homeland Security Opportunities. Project on Government Oversight, May 2005. p 26.
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78. FY2007 Committee Report: Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill, 2007. House Committee on Appropriations, May 19, 2006. p 125. Available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_reports&docid=f:hr474.pdf
Downloaded October 16, 2006.
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79. “Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 97-1 to the Secretary of Energy.” Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, March 7, 1997. p 2.
http://www.dnfsb.gov/pub_docs/dnfsb/rec_1997_01.html
Downloaded October 16, 2006.
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